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What kind of future worlds do experts of international security envision? This paper studies the role 
of experts in DC’s think tanks, a relatively small world socially and culturally highly homogeneous. 
It underlines the characteristics of this epistemic community that influence the way its analysts make 
claims about the future for security. The DC’s marketplace of the future lacks diversity. The paradigms 
analysts use when they study international politics are very similar. Moreover, the range of issues they 
focus on is also relatively narrow.
The paper highlights three main features of the relation between those who make claims about the 
future of security and those to whom these claims are addressed (mainly policymakers). First, it shows 
that, for epistemic but also for political reasons, the future imagined in think tanks is relatively stable 
and linear. This future also contributes to the continuity of political decisions. Second, the paper shows 
that think tanks are also "victims of groupthink", especially when they make claims about the future. 
Third, it underlines a paradox: scenarios and predictions create surprises. Claims about the future have 
a strong tunneling effect. They reinforce preexisting beliefs, create focal points, and operate as blinders 
when, inevitably, the future breaks away from its linear path.
Les experts en matière de sécurité sont régulièrement sollicités pour donner leur avis sur le futur de 
la politique internationale. A Washington, le petit monde des think tanks est un véritable « marché du 
futur ». Son homogénéité culturelle et sociale est très forte, la diversité des idées qui s’y expriment très 
réduite. Dans ce marché des idées, le spectre de futurs possibles est dès lors très étroit.
On note trois caractéristiques principales de cette énonciation du futur. Premièrement, pour des 
raisons épistémiques et politiques, le futur est linéaire, et ainsi conforte la stabilité et la continuité 
des décisions politiques. Deuxièmement, ces savoirs de l’expertise sont fortement enracinés dans un 
« groupthink », une pensée collective entravée par des biais qui s’auto-entretiennent et qui conduisent 
à lisser fortement prédictions et scénarios. Troisièmement, c’est là un paradoxe, les anticipations de la 
sécurité internationale contribuent à créer un effet de surprise. Par des effets de tunnel, l’attention des 
praticiens de la sécurité tout comme celle du public se concentre sur des points focaux, les empêchant 
de voir les inévitables ruptures avec les trajectoires linéaires émerger et se réaliser.
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		 	 "The	American-Soviet	conflict	is	not	some	temporary	aberration
	but	a	historical	rivalry	that	will	long	endure."1
"The	Cold	War	is	not	over."2
		 	 "I	don’t	think	that	anybody	could	have	predicted
that	these	people	would	take	an	airplane	and	slam	into	the	World	Trade	Center,	
take	another	one	and	slam	into	the	Pentagon."3
Brzezinski’s quote reflects what was once the mainline of the analysis in Soviet Studies and in 
the field of international relations in American universities and think-tanks, and more generally 
throughout the Western world. No matter how surprizing this might seem today, this opinion 
prevailed until the late 1980s, as can be seen in Scowcroft’s statement. Two decades later, 
Condoleezza Rice expressed the surprize many analysts and policymakers felt on September 11. 
This quote was in response to some of the criticism of US policy that was made public during 
the hearings organized by the September 11 Commission that started in 2003. 
Both Brzezinski and Rice come from academia and both were caught off guard by major 
turning points in international politics. It should be added that Scowcroft also worked in think-
tanks and in consulting. What does this situation tell us about the structure of applied knowledge 
in international relations? The theory practice nexus is a well-studied issue in international 
relations,4 that is of concern for both academics and policy experts. However one aspect of 
the role knowledge plays in the realm of practice needs to be more thoroughly investigated.
1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, 10th US National Security Advisor, 1986, in Brzezinski, 1986: XIII.
2 Brent Scowcroft, 9th and 17th US National Security Advisor, January 22, 1989, in Mann, 2009: XIII.
3 Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, February 7, 2004.
4 Snyder, 2004; Walt, 2005.
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How are claims about the future made in a professional realm that is obsessed with knowing 
the future? How are these claims "sold" in the public marketplace of ideas? Is anticipating the 
future of international politics about anticipating change? These are the questions this study 
aims to answer at a time when the issue of predicting the future is widely debated in the policy 
world5 and attracts scholars from different disciplines. 
Claims about the Future in International Politics: the Stability of Change 
"The	inclination	to	predict	is	deeply	embedded	in	U.S.	institutions."6 
Policymakers rarely make any decision without trying to anticipate the consequences of their 
decision or at least without claiming to do so. Whether they have an accurate sense of what 
these consequences are likely to be, if they are correct or not, if it is even possible to have a 
vision of the future are different matters. Anticipating the future—in most cases envisioning a set 
of different possible futures—is inherently part of the exercise of decision making. Anticipating 
is therefore one important aspect of the study of international politics and more widely of 
international relations. There are specialists devoted to this task and it is indeed essential to 
explain and understand how this knowledge is developed. 
This study focuses on the claims about the future made by experts working in DC’s think-tanks 
which are leaders in the realm of international politics. It highlights where those specialists 
look when they envision the future of the world and it underlines the important issues that 
these experts consider to be relevant for the next decades. The future—i.e. a claim about what 
international politics will look like in the mid- or the long- term—relies in great part on the 
nature and the framing of these questions. 
This study relies on the assumption that the work experts produce reflects and nurtures a 
"horizon of expectation".7 What this terminology suggests is that some visions of the future 
are "future made present". They are true visions for the future grounded in the present. For 
example, policy debates during the 1990s were dominated by the idea that democracy and 
the market had won over communism and failed states. In this case, capitalism and pluralism 
would be the new horizon for international politics.8 Historically, every phase of international 
politics is characterized by one or more visions of the future, each built on a collection of 
5 Danzig, 2011.
6 Richard Danzig, Chairman of the Board, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), in Danzig, 2011: 8. 
Danzig is also a senior analyst at CNAS and at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and other 
US institutions.
7 Koselleck, 1959.
8 For a reaction to this consensus, see Mearsheimer 1990. Interestingly, Mearsheimer tried to counter the 
teleological future claims made by a majority of policymakers, experts, and academics about the post-Cold War 
era in Europe. His predictions have proven to be even less accurate than those of his counterparts.
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expectations about what the future will look like.9 More often then not, these anticipations 
merge and contribute to forging focal points.10
This study attempts to draw the lines of the "web of meaning" that policy experts weave 
in their publications when they address the issue of the future of international politics, and 
in the social life that they create in their tightly-knit world of greater DC. It emphasizes the 
importance of the relationship between the supply of ideas about the future of world politics 
and the demand for anticipatory knowledge. There are numerous think-tanks and many are 
willing to be oracles in DC. The demand for predictions is also strong. This is especially true 
at the Department of Defense.
It is difficult to predict the future, or, as the famous baseball player Yogi Berra used to say, 
"predicting is difficult, especially about the future". Scholarly work and conventional wisdom 
would agree on this point. This study takes note of the fact that there are some difficulties 
and hurdles in knowing the future (how could it be otherwise?). Yet, it refutes the idea, often 
implicit in this statement, that these constraints are only epistemic. There are other reasons 
why predictions are necessarily approximative. The prevailing view of the future is found at the 
intersection of the demand for knowledge and the supply of predictions. This study underlines 
the important role of the knowledge practice nexus in the framing of expectations and how it 
orients future claims. Indeed, anticipations—both their format and their content—greatly depend 
on the relation between the predictor and those requesting predictions. In other words, the 
quality and the content of claims about the future depends to whom they are addressed and 
on whose behalf they are made, and not solely on the knowledge of the provider. 
Moreover, the traditional vision according to which predictions are just "difficult" suffers from 
some serious problems. It discourages any attempt to improve their quality through changes in 
some aspects of the relationship between knowledge providers and policymakers. This vision 
also serves the purpose of exculpating the experts who are less responsible for their mistakes 
given that the exercise is so difficult (or just impossible to perform). 
Policymakers are also less responsible for their own mistakes and less constrained in their 
decision-making. Indeed, if there were precise methods for knowing the future, policymakers 
would just have to follow the indications given by those who make them. To a certain extent, 
one may also question whether policymakers really want to know the future. Indeed, reluctance 
to change is very characteristic of the world of politics.11 Whereas, of course, a willingness to 
actually know the future relies on quite the opposite, i.e. the acceptance of change. 
This clearly stands as a paradox. On the one hand, there is a strong demand for anticipatory 
knowledge. On the other, there is a preference for stability and thus a reluctance to accept change. 
This paradox stands at the core of the subtle relation between predictors and policymakers. 
This study explores the role of claims about the future in the field of security in the US. It 
builds on a research about the world of expertise in DC. These analysts address their views 
9 On the post-Cold War, see Betts, 2010.
10 Schelling, 1960.
11 Danzig, 2011: 14.
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about the future of international politics, directly or indirectly, publicly or not, to American 
policymakers.12 This study builds on data collected on the websites of the think-tanks those 
experts belong to. 
A great number of their views are available in the public realm, in reports, op-eds, articles or 
books and now widely on the various think-tanks’ internet websites. Claims about the future 
differ from intelligence although there is necessarily some overlap between the two. And of 
course the intelligence community relies on predictions made available by both governmental 
and non-governmental experts. Claims about the future are also of great concern to the general 
public, the media, international organizations, and leaders from other countries. Given the 
role the US plays in international affairs it is important, to say the least, for other players to 
take into account how US experts envision the future. Those experts are mostly to be found in 
governmental agencies, in the military, and in think-tanks, which are numerous in the DC area.13 
Why Now?
There is a wide consensus that we live in a turbulent world, especially when we compare 
the current state of international affairs to the system that prevailed during the Cold War. The 
international system during the Cold War is now seen as having been fairly stable, a period in 
which the balance of power and deterrence successfully played their role, mainly stabilizing 
the relations between the two superpowers.14 According to this vision, total war was avoided 
because its anticipated costs were too high and therefore had a dissuasive effect. There was 
an overall consensus that nuclear stability would prevail (it did in the fairly limited time of the 
Cold War, and, so far and luckily, has continued to prevail). There was also a consensus about 
the permanence of the USSR (a prediction that proved to be wrong). These analyses relied 
on rational choice theory, cost benefit analysis, or behavioral studies.15 They focused on the 
12 I made two trips to DC in 2011 (March and May) during which I interviewed some of these experts. I also 
did interviews in New York in April 2010 and May 2011. I’ve collaborated extensively with Thomas Richard 
(University of Clermont-Ferrand) who worked on the quantitative data and statistics we collected, with Sciences 
Po’s atelier de cartographie (Sciences Po’s maps and geography unit, http://cartographie.sciences-po.fr/) and with 
Sciences Po’s Medialab (http://www.medialab.sciences-po.fr/). I wish to thank Benoit Martin, Marie-Françoise 
Durand, Patrice Mitrano and Thomas Ansart from the atelier de cartographie, as well as Tommaso Venturini, 
Mathieu Jacomy and Paul Girard from the Medialab.
13 http://www.gotothinktank.com/thinktank/. Among the great number of think-tanks that can be found in 
DC, a portion of them has been selected from this ranking list (the top portion) and some other organizations 
that are significant for the purposes of this study have been added. The study on the experts’ profile (first section) 
includes 15 organizations (Appendice 1-A). The study on the language they use when they make anticipations 
(second section) includes 11 organizations (Appendice 1-B). The study on the sites’ content (fourth section) includes 
eight organizations (Appendice 1-C). Some of the members of these organizations have been interviewed and 
some of the data available on their website has been processed. This study is therefore based on qualitative and 
quantitative research. For confidentiality reasons, the names of the interviewees will not appear in this paper, but 
can be found in Appendice 2. Some governmental experts have also been interviewed.
14 This is mainly the Realist vision of the Cold War, which was also prevalent before the Fall of the Wall. For 
a defense of the stability of the Cold War, see Waltz 1964.
15 There is an ample literature on the stability created by nuclear deterrence. Its best theorist, spokesman, and 
advocate is still Kenneth Waltz. See Sagan and Waltz 1995. Neo-realism includes the possibility of anticipation, 
when it explains what it sees as "continuities". See Waltz, 1979: 69.
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explanation of political and strategic stability. The methods used when making assumptions about 
the future were pretty homogenous and the knowledge system on which these assumptions 
relied remained unchallenged until the end of the Cold War. 
Experts are now facing a bigger challenge. Conflicts in Africa or in the Middle East are 
considered less predictable than the nuclear behavior of the US and the USSR. There is some 
degree of truth to this. Indeed, the number of players on the nuclear scene is more limited than 
the number of participants to ethnic and civil wars; nuclear players formed a more homogeneous 
group than the participants to post-Cold War conflicts, both domestic and international. Nuclear 
games included fewer variables than experts now must take into account when they discuss the 
future of terrorism or ethnic conflicts. New types of conflicts are thought to be more difficult 
to anticipate than basic games within a set of limited players sharing the same kind of interests 
and a set of homogenous values (such as in a bipolar nuclear arena). 
International politics is often seen as the realm of unpredictable, tragic, and catastrophic 
events, especially in the aftermath of September 11. The (plausible) perils of civil wars and 
terrorist attacks have superseded the vision of improbable mutual destruction. 
"Global politics" was introduced in the 1990s as a descriptive and analytical concept that would 
help better understand the realm of international politics. This vague terminology implicitly 
suggests that there is a growing interdependence and that micro and social or cultural factors 
can easily affect the macro-system of international politics and interstate relations.16 Because 
the chain of consequences of a single decision is considered to be so ample, predicting them 
all is a very serious challenge. There is a growing sense that we are living in a "global risk 
society" or in a "world risk society".17
Anticipating the future is meant to play a new role. As the view that we live in an era of 
uncertainty is reinforced, so is the interest in predictions. The number of experts who discuss 
the future has significantly increased over the last two decades.18 Claims about the future are 
justified as an attempt to master the risks that are the cause of uncertainty. This, of course, is 
a paradox. Indeed, given that the world is more uncertain, claims about the future are more 
hazardous and less trustworthy. Are they not there creating more uncertainty, as they might 
be the source of approximate information? 
Another question arises. Have predictors adapted the knowledge upon which they rely to make 
claims about the future to the new environment in which international politics is viewed as a 
scene where unexpected events happen and break the routine of stability of interstate relations? 
Visions of international politics change at radical junctures. As in the case of Minerva’s owl, they 
change only once change has occurred. This affects both the academic scene and the domain of 
more policy-oriented expertise. As the Cold War ended, the lenses through which the world was 
16 We see here a convergence of different approaches. Sociological theory focusing on the micro-macro nexus 
(Badie and Smouts, 1992; Rosenau, 1990), liberal theory (Nye, 1992), and cultural approaches (Huntington, 1996) 
appear to be strange bedfellows.
17 These terms became mainline following the publication of Ulrich Beck’s work (Beck, 1992 and 1999).
18 For an overview, see my blog that lists a sample of these organizations and companies: http://blogs.
sciences-po.fr/recherche-predictions/2010/02/03/forecasting-as-business/
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being scrutinized changed. On the academic scene, this meant the relative decline of Realism 
and concomitantly the emergence and the strengthening of a constructivist vision of international 
politics as well as the consolidation of Liberalism. Within think-tanks, experts needed to diversify 
their skills. Sovietology became "passé" and came under heavy criticism as "transitology" (the 
study of the shift to democracy and to the free market) boomed.19 The latter replaced the former.20
This change is in itself extremely telling. Indeed, balance of power and deterrence are rather 
past-oriented concepts. The role of structures—and therefore the role of the past—are paramount 
when these models are applied to explain the present and possibly to make extrapolations about 
the future. In the 1990s, the vision of international politics became more future-oriented as 
transition became a major reference point of international studies.21 Transitology is future-oriented, 
since it tries to capture a moment of change within a teleological framework. Democracy and 
the free market are the horizons of the future to which newly post-communist societies were 
said to converge. This idea was well laid out in Francis Fukuyama’s global bestseller, which is 
one of the most illustrious examples and reflections of this Zeitgeist.22
The events of September 11 are a radical juncture of critical importance in the recent history of 
expertise and predictions. The shock created by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and  the Pentagon gave more weight to the arguments of those who previously defended the 
idea  that there was a need for sound intelligence and anticipatory analysis because uncertainty 
was a real danger for the US. New approaches to forecasting became known to the public. 
The road to the future was set on a new track. A new vision was sold on the market where it 
still occupies a leading share. The origins and the future of Islamic networks and their leaders 
became a leading topic of discussion. 
Since September 11, the US has led two major wars. US troops recently left Iraq. They remain 
in Afghanistan. The US is involved in many other combat operations, tracking individual targets 
and using drones in countries such as Pakistan or Yemen. The common feature of these military 
operations has been "prevention".23 The US claimed it did not want to be caught off guard again 
and the presidency of G. W. Bush has defined a new direction and a set of goals. Its purpose was 
to anticipate the dangers from which the US might suffer if it were to remain passive. Although 
there has been a significant change of discourse and tone with the election of President Obama 
in 2008, there has not been a radical departure from the preventive framework that was set 
in place in the wake of September 11. Anticipations fuel preventive action and predictions are 
needed in order to justify the preventive use of force. The US still targets combatants who are 
said to be terrorists on the basis of the danger that they are likely to pose if they were to pursue 
what are considered to be their goals. 
19 For a historical account of Sovietology, see Engerman, 2010.
20 Among many other examples, the Soviet Studies graduate program at Sciences Po ,"Cycle supérieur d’études 
soviétiques et est-européennes", was renamed in 1994 and became "Cycle supérieur d’étude comparée de la 
transition démocratique dans l’Europe post-communiste" (my emphasis).
21 Colonomos, 2011b.
22 Fukuyama, 1992.
23 Colonomos, 2009.
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The purpose of this study is to explain the role of claims about the future by describing and 
analyzing those who make such claims and the methods they employ. This is a study of a very 
specific "marketplace of ideas"24: the DC futures marketplace. It seeks to capture the essence 
of this market defined as the meeting point of a strong demand for predictive knowledge and 
a supply of predictive ideas rooted in different kinds of knowledge. 
Most publications on predictions focus on one main question. Are predictions accurate? They 
usually stress the limitations of predictive knowledge and therefore underline the epistemic 
fallacies of predictions.25 This paper argues that the ultimate goal of those claims might not 
be truth seeking. Predictors are aware of the limitations of their expertise. Policymakers also 
know that these tools are largely imperfect. Given these limitations, what other purposes might 
their ideas serve? 
Predictions are a reflection of US policy, because of the great symbiosis between those who 
elaborate them and those in charge of policy. They operate, as it is argued in this study, as 
focal points for international security policies. They are a mode of communication, a common 
language, and an interface between those who have an opinion about what statesmen eventually 
ought to do and policymakers who have an opinion about how experts should think and what 
they should study.
I — DC’s small worlD of expertIse
A Brief Historical Reminder about the Think-Tanks’ Social Club
Think-tanks are numerous in the United States compared to other parts of the world, where 
for cultural, political, fiscal, and legal reasons they play a much less important role. There are 
about 1,800 think-tanks in the United States,26 nearly 400 in DC alone. Their role is to provide 
expertise in the realm of public policy and "sell" their ideas. They seek to have their views quoted 
by policymakers, statesmen, politicians, the military, or the media and increase the impact of 
their views on public policy and thereby enhance their credibility and their reputation. 
The history of think-tanks in the US is well known.27 It parallels the history of the dominance and 
hegemony of the US in international politics. Think-tanks originated in the early twentiethth century 
with the initiatives of Robert Brookings and Andrew Carnegie. The Institute for Government Research, 
the precursor of Brookings Institution (1927) was one of the earliest think-tanks. The United States 
has a long tradition in philanthropy and think-tanks benefit heavily from private donations. 
24 Kaufman, 2004.
25 Choucri and Robinson, 1978; Jervis, 1991-2; Doran, 1999; Freeman and Job, 1979. On the biases of experts, 
see Tetlock, 2005.
26 McGann, 2011: 18.
27 Abelson, 1996; Rich, 2004.
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The role of think-tanks is to provide knowledge and information relevant for public policy. 
Officially, their expertise is said to be impartial. Yet, think-tanks do have political and ideological 
identities that serve as labels in order to differentiate them from their competitors. As will be 
shown below, these proclaimed differences and identities play a lesser role than one might 
think in the selection of the issues which they study and the perspectives they take. 
Science plays an important role in think-tanks. After World War Two, the Rand Corporation 
fully embodied this scientific turn. The Rand Corporation—which is a highly relevant player 
in this study—introduced new scientific models mostly used to deal with security and nuclear 
issues. It hired experts and scholars from the hard sciences who worked with social scientists. 
This was the golden age of Rand when Nobel prizes laureates such as Gary Becker, Edmund 
Phelps, or Paul Samuelson were among their staff and consultants. Forecasting was and remains 
at the core of Rand’s activities. 
Think-tanks also have a social function: they operate as "gentlemen’s clubs". The perfect 
example is the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), whose principal headquarters are in New 
York, in a townhouse located in the Upper East Side in Manhattan two blocks away from Central 
Park. The CFR was modeled on the Chatham House in London that was established one year 
earlier, in 1920. The CFR also has a DC branch situated near the White House. The CFR—as 
it is the case for other organizations—hosts conferences where business leaders, statesmen, 
politicians, and diplomats intermingle with experts. It operates as a club in the sense that you 
become a member by invitation.28 The CFR can pride itself on being a prestigious organization 
where ideas that have strongly influenced US foreign policy have been drafted and discussed. 
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct" written by US diplomat George Kennan appeared in Foreign 
Affairs, the journal published by the Council. This article was the basis for the containment 
policy during the Cold War. A few decades later, in 1993, Samuel Huntington published his 
article "The Clash of Civilizations" in the same journal. 
Think-tanks are therefore a locus for the exchange of ideas. Attending the conferences they 
host gives their members the impression that they are part of the inner circles of power. As I will 
underline by analyzing the content of the websites of those organizations, the "future" is often 
a subject of debate at think-tanks. This is consistent with the atmosphere of exclusiveness that 
think-tanks—especially at the CFR—deliberately create. For the members of this club, access 
to future oriented analysis about international security is a mark of "distinction". The "future" 
is something secret and only a happy few are entitled to consult the oracles. Nevertheless, 
there is such strong pressure on think-tanks to be visible in the public arena that many of their 
findings are available in their publications and online. 
This paradox—the willingness to be highly visible and also preserve a degree of confidentiality— 
is well expressed in the "Chatham House rule" that the CFR and many other think-tanks apply. 
Accordingly, participants are free to use the information received during a meeting at the think-
tank, but neither the identity, the affiliation of the speaker, nor that of any other participant 
may be revealed. Future telling also combines the need for publicity and the preference for 
confidentiality. They go hand-in-hand. If their analyses were not ultimately made public the 
28 http://www.cfr.org/about/membership/ 
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think-tanks would have no voice in public debates and their members would have no interest 
in having early, private, privileged access to their studies and experts. 
Since the end of the Cold War, think-tanks have moved from the study of US-Soviet issues to other 
questions that have included ethnic conflict, the rules and goals of the transition to democracy, 
terrorism and Islam and so on. As it will clearly appear in this study, think-tanks are followers 
and are slow to change. This, of course, contradicts their primary ambition, which is to see "the 
real world" and be ahead of their times.29 Therefore, the fall of the Soviet Union was a shock in 
American think-tanks as much as everywhere else. These organizations were required to adapt and 
direct their efforts to the study of issues that were more compatible with the unipolar setting that 
characterized post-Cold War international politics. They also reinforced their role in foreign policy 
formulation and some of them became strongly involved in the debates on NATO enlargement. 
This study focuses on think-tanks in the DC area, where a great proportion of them are 
established. The DC area is also the place where most think-tanks that focus on international, 
security, and foreign policy issues traditionally have their headquarters. The 15 organizations 
from which this data is drawn from are all located in the DC area.30 They are among the largest 
and most highly ranked think-tanks in the US and in the world.31 They have a particularly 
important voice and are highly respected. The data used in this section is based on the profiles 
of 398 researchers working in those organizations32. This list includes only those who have 
a senior experience and status. Due to their size, the number of researchers they employ 
and, for a great number of them, the prestige that they have, these 15 organizations produce 
most of the work that policymakers refer to when they look for external advice in the field of 
international politics. They are the most quoted in the media33 and many highly trained students 
from prestigious universities hope to work for them.
Who Are the Experts?34 
What is the social profile of security experts who work in think-tanks in the DC area? When 
discussing their role, it is important to know about their background and the social and cultural 
environments in which they operate.
29 This was very much their ambition at their origins in places such as Rand. They investigated new issues 
and developed innovative tools of analysis that were a breakthrough.
30 As it is the case for Rand and the Lexington Institute.
31 Thirteen of them come from the Think-tank to Go Global Ranking. Two other organizations that are not on 
this list have been added: The Lexington Institute and The Washington Institute on Near East Policy. Their area 
of specialization is highly relevant for this study. See Appendice 1-A.
32 This data is based on the information that is given on their web pages where their c.v. appears.
33 Although data needs to be updated, in terms of media citation, ten out of 15 of these organizations come 
first in a list that would capture their presence on the media. See http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1182. For 
a recent assessment of their public impact that includes their media appearances, see the Go Global Ranking 
("Greatest Impact of Public Policy", #26, 48-49).
34 As for the other information provided in this paper, data was collected on September 12, 2011. The web’s 
cartography was processed on October 5, 2011.
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Security experts in DC form an "epistemic community".35 The definition of an epistemic 
community captures well the characteristics of the group they form. Indeed, security experts 
use a common set of analytical scientific tools, mainly those of the social sciences. A great 
number of them are trained in economics, political science, or international relations. Their 
knowledge is applied to policy issues. Finally, they share a common set of values, in so far as 
the organizations they are part of expressly want to contribute to preserving US security and 
maximizing its interest. 
The vision they develop when anticipating the future is heavily influenced not only by their 
education and the norms and values derived from their backgrounds but also by their interest 
in having access to the "real world" and to policymakers who share their values and vision of 
the world. As this first series of data will easily shows, the social world of expertise is a fairly 
small and homogenous one.
The organizations that appear above are the leading centers that provide knowledge in the 
field of politics and the majority of them clearly focus on international politics. Experts whose 
primary domain of research is "defense and security" form a large majority. Actually, experts 
on security and defense (106) outnumber the experts who primarily work on all geographical 
areas combined. The Middle East is the most researched regional area (43), followed by Asia-
Pacific (31)36 and Russia (16). Only five researchers are specialists on Europe. This tells us what 
the priorities of think-tanks are and what knowledge is available in those organizations. 
Although this data does not include any specific information about the vision of the future 
that these experts might share, it does give some indications about the social expectations 
to which these professionals must respond. "Defense and security" is the area where these 
expectations converge. Indeed, most area specialists also have an expertise in this field. 
"Defense and security" is the "horizon of expectation" of this small world, which echoes a very 
traditional tragic vision of world politics. The Middle East, Asia (notably China), and Russia 
35 Haas, 1992.
36 Six of them rank China as their number one area of expertise.
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are foreign policy "experiences", i.e. they are in Koselleckian terms "spaces of experiences" 
(loci where the US has been or is being challenged as a power in international politics). 
"Soft" issues such as demography, education, or law gather a fairly small number of people. 
The think-tank world reflects the traditional Cold War dominance of "hard issues", those that 
are paramount for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Alternative views 
are clearly not well represented. For example, although it has become a fashionable concept 
at the UN and in some academic circles, the concept of "human security" is definitely not 
very prominent in this small world. The areas of expertise of these professionals are also a fair 
reflection of a world vision in which conflict is the predominant mode of interaction between 
international players. Hence, few of them concentrate on the study of the law or cooperation. 
Indeed, trade is usually seen as an antagonistic mode of relating with competitors. There is 
one difference with the traditional thinking of the Cold War: the strong interest in the Middle 
East and a definition of security that also includes violence brought by non-state actors, as in 
the case of terrorism. 
This calls for further analysis based on other observations and on qualitative work. The experts’ 
major focal points of analysis have not radically altered since the end of the Cold War, except 
for the study of the role of Islam and terrorism. This shows the inertia of those institutions and 
the challenge they face when it comes to adapting to change in international politics. Indeed, 
those who work in the realm of "defense and security" have a very traditional understanding 
of international politics. The number of experts on Russia is quite high, as compared to the 
number of experts on countries of similar importance such as India or Brazil, and higher than 
the number of China specialists. This also testifies to the legacy of the Cold War. Many experts 
of the former USSR followed the "transition" and, since then, have specialized in post-Soviet 
Russian society. 
Another variable which explains why this vision leaves aside important areas of the world 
and novel issues is the chain of production for ideas in think-tanks. Some major think-tanks 
partly rely on funding made available by very large foundations. These foundations speak 
the same language that experts use and share the same keywords. In some cases, there is a 
time span of five to ten years between the moment when a decision on a theme of research 
is made within the foundations and the moment when the think-tank delivers its work. This 
accounts for the inertia of expertise. This linear continuity also hampers dramatically the experts’ 
capacity to anticipate the future. It should be noted that, from this perspective, the division 
of labor between, on the one hand the policy arena and the world of think-tanks that would 
supposedly be flexible and fine-tuned to "real" events, and on the other the academic scene 
that is supposedly slow to react to the changes of the outside world.
Another variable is the logic of politics and the policy world. Leaders have their own vision 
of the world, rooted in their past. Their experience orients their thinking on what the most 
important current issues of the world are. They are also caught in another temporal chain. 
Defining what those key issues are also depends on past events such as a war or a terrorist 
attack that are of great concern to their constituents and therefore important if they want to 
be reelected.
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Senior researchers often have policy and governmental experience—the kind of trajectory 
sought by their younger colleagues. They have worked within previous administrations. The 
State Department and the Pentagon have been their primary affiliations. Some are retired 
diplomats and military officers. In addition to working at a think-tank a number of them also 
hold teaching positions, in most cases as adjunct professors,37 but in some cases as permanent 
faculty. A few of them are former journalists or academics.38 
What is the usual profile of an expert who writes reports on international security? He or 
she—mostly he since very few women occupy this position—works in a think-tank in greater 
DC, has a masters or increasingly a PhD in public policy and/or international affairs from a 
high profile university most likely located in the North-East. 
37 A great number of them teach at Georgetown, which has a longstanding tradition in the training of young diplomats.
38 The data collected on the web pages of these researchers is also a reflection of how the analysts want to be 
perceived by the general public. Very few of them (3) indicate that they have had working experience with the CIA.
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Very few analysts are non-American. A few of them are Europeans. Occasionally, think-tanks 
hire experts from the Arab world, China, India, or Pakistan, if those analysts have received 
basic training in the US. Some experts have studied at prestigious universities in the UK such 
as Oxford. The training that they received there (the topics on which they have focused on and 
the paradigms they have learned), however, does not significantly differ from the education 
that their colleagues received in American universities. We also have to bear in mind that a 
great number of these analysts acquired their diplomas during the Cold War (in the 1970s and 
the 1980s) when international relations as a discipline was heavily dominated by one single 
paradigm, Realism. Despite the fact that Realism was the dominant paradigm when they 
acquired their diplomas, today liberal ideas are also prominent. Indeed, they are part of the 
traditional American vision of international politics. These ideas also boomed in the 1990s. 
Overall, the world of experts in DC is very small. It is also quite parochial. Many of these 
experts were acquainted before entering the world of think-tanks. Data shows the great social 
and cultural homogeneity of this milieu. Therefore, DC’s concentration of power is not merely 
a myth for bogus conspiracy theorists, fans of Michael Moore or Marxists.39 As the two maps 
below clearly show, the proximity of centers of expertise, governmental offices and political 
institutions as well as universities and the media is a true social and geographical reality.
39 In the US, the first sociological study on the concentration of power by homogeneous elites is C. W. Mills’ 
book The Power Elite published in 1956. 
Mapping Security Expertise in DC
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What can we learn from the observation of another world that parallels the physical and 
urban world we live in? The map below shows the links between the different organizations 
on the web.40 It is an illustration of their density and their strength. It also shows what are 
the common nodes these sites share, i.e. the websites where one of the webpages of two or 
more websites can lead to (their one degree of separation).41
What we learn from this graph confirms what we already knew: that the social and political 
worlds of DC’s think-tanks is fairly insular and cohesive. While think-tanks compete for 
influence, there is a certain degree of homogeneity in the content of the websites. This also 
shows that most of these professionals attend events that are organized by their peers and 
therefore participate to the buildup of the community as such. 
The density of the links within the conservative group of organizations on the left side 
can be explained by the fact that these organizations feel the need to "stick together". 
Conservative organizations seem to feel threatened by what they perceive to be an intellectual 
environment favorable to liberal ideas. These organizations have solid ties to the media 
and to other centers that share their conservative views (both politically and economically), 
such as for example the Mercatus Center or the Catounbound website. Twitter is the only 
social network that ties together the members of these websites. Yet, it appears to be very 
central. Indeed, many of these experts have a twitter account and its reference appears on 
their webpage. 
In both worlds—greater DC as well as on the internet—think-tanks form a dense and 
integrated epistemic community that is tightly linked to its urban environment and the media 
world. It is not just selected opinions and projects that they share. As the data collected in 
this first section and these two graphs testify, they are part of a collective "web of meaning". 
40 Unfortunately, two think-tanks are missing from this graph, the CFT and the Brookings Institution. Their 
websites are protected against the internet tools—such as NaviCrawler—that are used to draw this map.
41 In the field of IR, scholars of NGOs have started to make use of this research technique when they 
analyze which themes humanitarian and civil organizations try to push forward and put on the agenda. See 
Carpenter, 2007.
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II — worDs for tellIng the future
Providing a well-documented, coherent, and appealing anticipatory analysis of world politics is 
one of the most important aspects of the experts’ work in think-tanks, if not the most important 
one. Policy work ought to be future-oriented. Let us first compare their activity to the role of 
other knowledge providers. These experts chose careers in the policy world considered more 
vibrant than what is often seen as a more subdued career in academia. The distinction between 
academia and non-academic expertise is indeed worth exploring. In the field of international 
relations, academic scholars mostly study present or past issues. Traditionally, they would put 
a strong emphasis on the past and use past examples as canonical case studies upon which 
they could base their theories.42
The case of the realist analytical model is very illustrative. Realist scholars draw inferences 
about the behavior of states using historical examples. One of the most well-known and 
debated issues within the Realist literature is World War One. There is one important and 
simple reason for that. The behavior of states during this conflict largely validates the basic 
concepts of Realism and especially defensive Realism, such as the security dilemma, the spiral 
model, and offense-defense balance. 
Academics are often criticized by students who want to follow a career in the policy world 
where they can apply their knowledge to the "real world".43 A common complaint is that 
academia is too anchored in the past, that it reproduces paradigms that do not keep up with 
social reality, and avoids new themes of research that challenge their pre-established views 
about state behavior. 
Quite symmetrically, experts in think-tanks (or in governments) study the present and/or 
provide opinions about the future. Because the task of think-tanks is to provide an analysis that 
is relevant for public policy they strongly emphasize this aspect of their work. Policymakers 
consult think-tanks on issues they consider to be the most salient problems of our time. They 
are interested in having information and views about the dynamic of unfolding events when 
they believe these events affect their interests and those of their country, i.e. the US, since most 
of the think-tanks’ clients are American entities. Therefore, one aspect should be particularly 
underlined: these issues are important to think-tanks because they are important for the US 
and its foreign policy and consequently for the rest of the world. This circle is auto-validating. 
Different terminologies are meant to describe what is a forward-oriented analysis or a "vision" 
of what international politics will be in the future. We tend to use the term "prediction". But 
what is a prediction? A prediction is commonly understood as the anticipation of a specific 
event, or the anticipatory analysis of a single trend that leads to a predicted outcome. It can 
also be expressed in probabilistic terms, as the probability of seeing the event that is being 
predicted occur. A forecast traditionally has another meaning. A forecast is an anticipation in 
42 Colonomos, 2011b.
43 This is particularly the case in professional schools of Public Affairs, where many political scientists and 
specialists of international relations teach.
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probabilistic terms of the occurrence of an event that is conditioned by other events that are 
also valued in probabilistic terms. If event A occurs (probabilities for it to occur are "x"), then 
C will occur (probabilities, in this context, for C to occur are "y"), the overall probability for 
C to occur is "z" ("x*y").44 Depending on the different options created by the probabilities, 
a forecast might include different scenarios. A forecast might include a time range, within 
which this event is likely to occur. "Anticipation" is a more generic term that designates a 
future-oriented analysis of unfolding events. These definitions are useful conceptually in so 
far as they help differentiating different kinds of anticipations. There are less pertinent when 
analyzing these experts’ work since these different aspects overlap and are not thoroughly 
differentiated by the practitioners. 
Moreover, their use might depend on what the experts perceive as the criteria that will be 
used when judging their findings based on the term they use to describe what they deliver. 
When interviewed, "predicting" is a terminology that most of these experts are clearly 
reluctant to use. 
There is indeed a degree of uneasiness in this regard. Experts are caught in a linguistic 
dilemma. On the one hand, experts cannot say they ignore future-oriented analysis. If they 
were to hold publicly to that position, their credibility as experts who serve as advisors would 
be incredibly damaged. On the other hand, they seem to believe that "prediction" implies a 
high degree of precision in their analysis, as if they needed to anticipate the occurrence of 
single events in the future and therefore be judged based on that criteria. However, in most 
cases, a future-oriented analysis—one that is based on the anticipation, the assumption, that 
certain events will occur—includes a sum of predictions.
As we can see from the next graph, strong linguistic rules prevail in this small world. 
Experts speak the same language, which is another component of their social and cultural 
homogeneity.
44 Freeman and Job, 1979.
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Experts fashion the term "future".45 On the various websites the term "future" usually appears 
in more than 30 per cent of the total number of pages.46 This is due to the fact that a great 
number of publications talk about the future of the world, a region, a conflict and so on. A very 
important number of conferences include future in their title because they want to attract an 
audience that is eager to learn about the unknown. "Future" clearly operates as a magnet and 
as a label. As we can see from this tag cloud, the Lexington institute (which is not included 
in the graph above) is the only anomaly. This organization has a blog called "early warning", 
thus a great number of entries with this keyword.47 
As a comparison:
What else do we learn from this graph? There are multiple ways of naming future-oriented 
analysis. The simplest is to use the term "future" which serves as a rallying point and as a 
contrasting feature of the think-tanks’ world. However, experts use other terms as well. "Risk" 
appears to be the second most used word when the analysis experts elaborate and make 
public is future-oriented. This is very telling of a choice and a bias that characterize the whole 
community. "Risk" has become a very popular term both in academic circles—in sociology 
and in political science—and in the policy arena, echoing fears that prevail among the general 
public. It therefore does not come as a surprise that experts have adopted it. Companies that 
sell political risk indexes have developed strongly over the last decade, as for example the 
45 These charts show the number of pages where these different words appear on those institutions’ web pages. 
We have used the "google advanced search" engine (http://www.google.fr/advanced_search). This search engine 
still has some fallacies that affect all the different searches, but this should not be a major problem since those 
charts are made to indicate the comparison between the different issues and organizations (and the same kind of 
bias apply). Each tag cloud provides another kind of information that is complementary. It indicates the percentage 
of the use of keywords within the different websites (the percentage of the pages where the term appears). For 
each organization, it can also compare the use of different keywords. Bars in black indicate that the number of 
hits found by the search engine are superior to the average number of the different hits of all the words searched, 
when in grey they indicate that the number of hits are bellow that average. For the sake of clarity, the number of 
think-tanks has been restricted to eight in the different charts. These are among the most important ones and there 
is a certain ideological diversity. The CFR, Carnegie and Brookings are seen as fairly centrist, whereas USIP and 
NAF are considered more liberal, and Heritage and Hudson have a conservative agenda; The tag cloud technique 
and format made it easier to include all the different organizations that have been searched in the first section.
46 From 10 per cent to nearly 60 per cent (Hudson). This data comes from another web search, the source of 
all the "clouds" presented in the study, provided by Sciences Po Medialab : http://jiminy.medialab.sciences-po.
fr/colonomos/
47 http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/early-warning-blog
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Eurasia Group.48 Ian Bremmer, a political scientist, who is the President of the Eurasia Group, 
clearly understood that "risk" was a new catchword that the market and companies were 
ready to incorporate.49 Other companies that specialized in audits and who now also do some 
anticipatory analysis on political and economic issues, have also adopted this language.50 
This is also consistent with one of the characteristics of expertise. The future is usually seen 
through the prism of pessimism. Researchers would very seldom speak about the future in positive 
terms. They usually reveal a threat and their analysis includes some negative consequences that 
can be avoided, if one were to follow the recommendations provided by the analyst. There is 
no track record of expertise. Indeed, experts are often wrong, but they will rarely suffer from 
their mistakes or their lack of insight. However, being overly optimistic is something that most 
experts would want to avoid. During the Cold War, a consensus prevailed in DC: the USSR was 
a "threat". If an expert distanced him or her self from this view, he or she might have sounded 
overly optimistic, or worse, looked naïve or foolish. 
When Kenneth Pollack—a well-known specialist of the Middle East at the Brookings 
Institution — published his book in 2002 on the coming war against Iraq, he claimed that it had 
WMD and that—even this was not an easy choice to make—the US ought to go to war against 
Saddam Hussein because it was too big of a threat to be left unchallenged.51 He predicted that 
eventually, the US would defeat Saddam Hussein and would create a new balance of power 
that would be favorable to US interests. 
Some of these claims are just truth errors, as in the case of WMD. Others are indeed predictions 
that just turned out to be wrong, as in the case of the consequences of toppling Hussein. The 
case of the Iraqi war shows that experts do make predictions. They do so when there is a 
prevailing consensus and a strong social pressure that orients their vision. It is rather disturbing 
to note that many in DC believed that the consequences of the war would be positive. This 
was partly based on an erroneous assumption about the WMD. Post September 11 patriotism 
also played a role. This account of the future is also very consistent with a tragic interpretation 
of what was or ought to be the US’ national interest. Within this "regime of truth", the interest 
of the US was to bring democracy to the world, by force if necessary. 
In the eyes of his or her community, an expert is never to be faulted for being wrong so long 
as he or she is just as wrong as every other member of the group. Indeed, there is a strong 
solidarity between the members of a community of experts. Kenneth Pollack’s reputation was 
not hurt by this error. On the contrary, Pollack was praised for having addressed publicly his 
errors in an interview that he released once it became clear that there were no WMD to be 
found in Iraq and that the consequences of the war were less positive than what he assumed 
before the intervention.52 He continues to be seen as a very prominent, widely quoted expert 
48 http://www.eurasiagroup.net/
49 Eurasia group developed a "top risks" index. See: http://www.eurasiagroup.net/pages/top-risks. 
50 See for example, Booz Allen Hamilton, http://www.boozallen.com/ 
51 Pollack, 2002.
52 Pollack, 2004.
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and has released numerous publications after the intervention, including two edited volumes 
in 2011: one on Iraq53 and the other on the future of the Arab World.54 
Experts feel the need to point to specific events, because it attracts the attention of the media, 
and is expected of them. If they were to avoid participating to debates about the future, they 
would be progressively isolated. In a democracy such as the US, the public space of debate—in 
the media or in other forums, such as public conferences—is nurtured by questions about the 
future. Those questions are a reflection of the current state of mind in US society. 
There is today in the United States an important debate about the future of US power. This 
reflects the anxiety of US leaders and the shock created by September 11 in American society 
at large. The 1990s have been traditionally considered a "unipolar moment". Some major 
international events such as September 11 or the 2003 Iraqi war and its consequences have 
weakened the feeling of self-confidence of the US. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise to 
see experts arguing about the future role and the status of the United States. According to Johan 
Galtung, a social scientist who has specialized in forward-oriented analysis and who claims 
to have a good track record, the United States will loose this status of superpower by 2020.55 
Even if they are less explicit about the date when this reversal of fortune will happen, many 
other analysts share this view. According to the report published by the National Intelligence 
Council—an organization that is part of the CIA—by 2025 new competitors will have rendered 
obsolete America’s hegemonic and unipolar power obsolete.56 However, according to the 
authors of this report, the power of the US will still outweigh the power of the other states. True, 
there are some analysts who express the view that the US will remain the sole superpower in 
20 years, but their number is smaller than what it used to be during the 1990s.57
III — on sCenarIos, ColleCtIve IntellIgenCe, preDICtIve markets anD algorIthms
Knowing the future is an essential part of strategy. Indeed, "gaming" or "war games" have existed 
for a long time. For example, Kriegsspiel was part of a German tradition, where gambling between 
soldiers and strategists was a preparation to war. Colonel von Reisswitz, an adviser to the ministry of 
War in ninetennth century Prussia is considered to be the inventor of this technique. This precedes 
53 Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward, Washington, DC, Brookings UP, 
February 2011.
54 The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, BUP, November 2011. The internet 
search tool "Publish or Perish" indicates there is no significant change between the average yearly number of 
quotes of K. Pollack’s work before the Iraq war (1998-2002) and after (2004-2011).
55 Galtung, 2009. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qm1HrQOV238&feature=related
56 NIC, 2008.
57 In the academic world, some authors have challenged the perspective of the decline of US power and argue 
that the US will continue to prevail. See Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008.
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more contemporary forms of gaming, where video games and computers are used to train soldiers 
for military combat and where experts make anticipatory claims based on the simulations. 
In the US, the evolution of military thinking is consistent with this approach. Important 
resources are devoted to research programs aimed at anticipating future threats. Battles are 
also sometimes fought "at a distance", when drones—now a very common device—are being 
used. Robots are part of this evolution. Soldiers fight like in a game, operating lethal devices 
that they follow on a screen.58
This section focuses on the five different categories of methodologies used by experts in 
think-tanks. Some of them are well known to the general public, others are not. 
Scenarios 
Experts favor the use of scenarios, a term they frequently use when they describe their work.59 
Building scenarios has many advantages as compared to other forms of anticipations. A scenario 
draws the picture of a possible world among other alternatives. At its best, a scenario is an 
approximate vision of what the future might look like. A scenario is the anticipation of an event 
or a trend60—usually a combination of the two—that is conditioned on the occurrence of a series 
of events that are hypothetical. The quality of a scenario does not depend on the answers that 
might be given to a specific question—"Will there be a war against country X by 2020?"—but 
rather on the coherence of the anticipation and the quality of the methodology that is being used. 
Advisors within and outside the government also develop scenarios designed to orienting 
decisions. According to how events unfold and how the scenarios are being used, the initial 
scenarios are being redrafted and they constantly evolve as events unfold. A new terminology is 
being used to characterize this process. This interactive dialogue is now called "sense-making". 
Scholars have discussed the rules that ought to guide the framing of scenarios.61 Three of them 
are most relevant here: writing scenarios implies the finding of a plot, a thread that will guide the 
trajectory of future events. There is also a need to make hypotheses about unexpected events that 
will reorient its trajectory away from its linear path. When writing a scenario about international 
politics, technology is also a variable that needs to be thoroughly analyzed. It is a challenge for 
those who want to make an interesting and plausible forecast to point to some of the technological 
innovations that might play a role in the middle term, over the next two or three decades. 
Therefore, those who build scenarios must aggregate the skills and the competencies of 
different analysts and bring together different forms of knowledge. Doing so will increase the 
coherence of the story they are writing. Writing scenarios is very often a collective exercise. 
58 Singer, 2009.
59 This appeared particularly well during the interviews.
60 On the uses of trends in political anticipations and their pitfalls, see Jouvenel, 1965.
61 Bernstein, Lebow, Gross Stein, Weber, 2000.
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This has several advantages. Experts compare their hypotheses and their views to those of their 
peers. It becomes a learning-by-doing process. 
This is also precisely what attracts those for whom those scenarios are made. A number of 
consulting companies offer the service of their analysts to policymakers who want to know 
more about the future of certain countries or the possible development of certain issues. 
Policymakers can hire private consultants who will organize sessions during which both experts 
and policymakers will work on the writing of scenarios. 
This has numerous advantages. It is a learning process and for the practitioners a prelude to 
decision-making. As a collective endeavor, it dilutes the responsibility of those who make claims 
about the future. Consensus building is seen as the best way to approach the future, since this 
should work as a correction of the individual biases of the members of the group. This method 
is attractive in so far as it is a mode of socialization and integration for political and economic 
elites who work on a common project in collaboration with experts who are seen as authorities 
in the field they explore. These exercises strengthen the social cohesion of a group and motivate 
its members around common goals. This example shows that making claims about the future 
(in this case scenarios) has social functions. 
Schools of public affairs also teach the scenario approach, as for example NYU’s Center on Global 
Affairs. The Center on Global Affairs Scenarios Initiative is headed by Michael Oppenheimer. 
It aims at building "across-disciplinary, forward-looking thinking on countries and issues critical 
to U.S. national interests".62 Oppenheimer has been a consultant to US governmental agencies 
for a long time and has been the President of Global Scenarios, a New York based consulting 
company. Oppenheimer organized working sessions where both experts and those who hired 
them would meet and elaborate scenarios about the future of world politics. 
Oppenheimer gathers students and faculty in a discussion on the possible scenarios for the 
future of given countries that are of interest to the US. The first one held in 2007 imagined 
"the future of Iraq after a substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in 2010". In 2008, the CGA 
discussed the case of Iran. Then followed China (2009), Russia (2010), Turkey (2010) and 
Pakistan (2011). The purpose of these workshops is to draw possible scenarios. For example, 
three different paths were envisaged for China: China’s survival would be at risk because of 
domestic pressures and social unrest, China would remain a strong and highly autocratic state, 
China would partially democratize and maintain its power. 
These choices reflect the priorities of think-tanks (i.e. the domain of expertise of their 
members). They also coincide with what are the most discussed countries in the media. There 
is a public space of debate of international security issues where China and Islam are the poles 
of attraction. These countries are seen through the lenses of the old balance of power model 
(China is an emerging superpower, it will become predominant and balance US power) and 
a cultural vision to IR (identities do play a role in world politics and Islam is the most radical 
counter-civilization to the West). The trajectories of these countries are then analyzed using 
concepts such as "authoritarianism" that is often invoked to discuss the case of non-democratic 
and non-Western regimes.
62 http://www.scps.nyu.edu/areas-of-study/global-affairs/cga-scenarios/
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Collective Intelligence
The history of predictions, forecasts, and scenarios shows that experts traditionally look 
for a consensus. This may seem a paradox as we may think of experts as members of a 
highly competitive community where each member has to distinguish himself or herself 
from his or her competitors. To a large extent, this appears to be incorrect. One of the first 
methods to be used in policy circles in the United States was the "Delphi Method". It was 
introduced by the Rand Corporation after World War Two, when the US Air Force asked 
Rand to develop a methodology for predictions.63 The Delphi method sets the standards 
for deliberation within the experts’ group of a single issue that will go through an iterative 
process until a consensus is found. This anticipates and reflects quite well the debates within 
the community of expertise at large. Diversity is limited and there is a willingness to be part 
of a wide circle of people who share a similar analysis. 
As other forecasting and prediction techniques do, the Delphi Method implicitly or 
explicitly relies on the idea of "collective intelligence". This paradigm was made popular 
by a best-selling book by James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds. The author uses 
several examples illustrating that the intelligence or the wisdom of a group is superior to 
the intelligence of single individuals. Surowiecki’s claim however differs in one crucial 
aspect from the Delphi method. Surowiecki and the social psychology research he refers to 
claim that collective intelligence is more powerful than the intelligence of individuals even 
when the members of the collective are not experts on the question they have to elucidate, 
whereas the individuals against whom they compete are experts. In other words, a group 
of non-experts beats an expert.64
Prediction Markets 
Over the last decade, we have witnessed the development of a new tool for making predictions: 
"futures markets" or "prediction markets", alternatively "predictive markets". According to their 
advocates—mainly those who have elaborated it—this tool is more precise than any other 
technique and, notably, more precise than what expertise based on qualitative work can deliver. 
Prediction markets are not new. The technology it uses—computer science and the internet—is. 
However, the idea has a long-standing tradition, when groups of people gathered to bet on the 
occurrence of single events. The result of the bet—the odds in favor or against—was meant to 
give an indication of the probability of the occurrence of the event. Some examples go back as 
early as the Renaissance when Cardinals used to place bets on the election of the next Pope.65 
63 Dalkey, 1969.
64 Surowiecki, 2004.
65 Rhode and Strumpf, 2008.
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Prediction markets are an example of political betting. In this case, individuals bet on the 
internet.66 The market indicates a probability of the occurrence of an event given by the value 
of its stock. Let us assume that people bet on whether there will be a military intervention in 
Syria by the end of 2012. The price of the stock bought by those who believe that there will be 
an intervention is 40 cents. This indicates that the probability for an intervention to happen is 
40 per cent. Correlatively, the price is 60 cents for those who believe that there will not be any 
intervention and indicates that, in this case, the probabilities are 60 per cent.67 
Prediction markets have recently expanded and there are now several websites where it is 
possible to bet on a list of events that include, social, economic, and political issues. The users of 
the website are able to launch a new bet by posting a new question online. This phenomenon is 
extremely interesting for various reasons. As the history of political betting and betting tout court 
illustrates, there is a resistance on behalf of governments to accept this initiative. In nineteenth 
century England, although betting was common in gentlemen’s clubs, rulers feared that betting 
would have negative effects on the masses. People would be distracted from their work and 
easily become idle. This addiction would have a negative effect on society. There were also some 
fears that the profits of this gamble might benefit those who lived at the margins of society, that it 
would finance illegal activities and create social unrest. There is another possible interpretation. 
Political betting threatens the authority of the state. It shows that a group of citizens knows 
more about the future than its leaders. Therefore, citizens will be all the more able to criticize 
the leader’s decisions if the latter fails to take account of accurate predictions. This bottom up 
approach to politics and democracy goes against the power of the established elites. 
In 2003, the Pentagon announced that it would launch a prediction market on the future of 
security. Based on the bets that would be placed online, the market would indicate the likelihood 
of a future terrorist attack.68 Robin Hanson—an economist at George Mason University—
was one of the leaders of this project. However, the Congress blocked this initiative and the 
Pentagon was forced to abandon it. This market is criticized on moral grounds; betting on the 
death of innocent people was seen as morally inappropriate. This is an interesting moment 
in the history of futures markets. This technique now has many supporters and this example 
shows that the military is, to a certain extent, ready to accept and use this innovation, as one 
source of information. However, as the reaction of the Congress illustrates, there are still 
strong political reservations against the use of these tools. It should be noted that an ongoing 
experiment is being funded by IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency at 
the Director of National Intelligence office).69 It aims to assess the value of predictive markets 
as reliable predictive tools and to evaluate whether they could be more effective than other 
methods used in policy.
66 One of the most widely used website is intrade (http://www.intrade.com/v4/home/). See also: http://blogs.
sciences-po.fr/recherche-predictions/2010/02/04/futures-market/ 
67 In fact, the symmetry is not quite as perfect, because of the transaction costs charged by the website.
68 It was called the FutureMap project and was developed by The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) at the DoD. See: http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/tia/futuremap-program.htm
69 http://forecastwe.org/. IARPA’s home page: http://www.iarpa.gov/ 
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Experts in think-tanks are, for obvious reasons, usually very much against prediction markets. 
In some other cases, they are even unaware that they exist. However, some organizations worry 
about being caught off guard in the wake of a technological change. Rand has developed an 
internal project on prediction markets. This is, of course, a very cautious initiative, because the 
result of the betting would not be made public and be available exclusively to those experts 
at Rand and eventually other people whom Rand would want to include in their experiment. 
This is not consistent with the principle on which prediction markets are based. Betting should 
be open to a wide variety of people and it is very important to diversify the members of the 
group in order to neutralize the biases of the individuals within the group.
The Algorithms of the Future 
Another predictive method has recently gained some publicity. Rational choice social 
scientists and computer scientists have developed algorithms designed for the prediction of 
political outcomes. Even though computers were much less powerful than what there are 
today, this dates back to the 1970s when social scientists argued that rational choice could be 
used to anticipate individuals’ decisions. It would also enable them to calculate the outcome 
of the interactions between the individuals who are part of the decision-making process. 
"Utility models" were being developed and mathematics provided the knowledge to elaborate 
algorithms that would formalize these models. This view is based on one premise: people 
maximize their interests. One of the pioneers of the use of algorithms in the prediction of 
political outcomes is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who is today a professor of political science 
at NYU. Bueno de Mesquita has focused his scholarly work on rational choice theory applied 
to the analysis of both domestic and international politics. He has also devoted much of his 
efforts to the development of predictive tools, i.e. an algorithm that would formalize his utility 
model. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is also a partner in the company Mesquita & Roundell,70 that 
sells its predictions to companies or governmental agencies such as the CIA. 
Obtaining information about the identity of the key players in a decision—within a 
government, in civil society, in an international organization and so on—is one step of the 
process. Those who use algorithms and sell their predictions will usually consult experts 
on the single issue that needs to be investigated. Using the algorithm, they then process 
this information in order to predict the decisions of these players and most importantly the 
outcome of the interactions between the various players. 
Both from an epistemic and political perspective, the stakes are quite high. From a knowledge 
perspective, this approach is diametrically opposed to contextually based social science, 
notably area studies. Quite provocatively, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims that knowing the 
language of the country that one studies is counterproductive and creates biases. He argues 
that an abstract and formalized approach to social issues would lead to more satisfying results. 
Bueno de Mesquita started his academic career in political science as a specialist of India. He 
70 http://mesquita-roundell.com/
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recalls that he was unable to anticipate the results of Indian elections. On the contrary, when 
he became interested in the mathematics of predictions, he claims that he was able to predict 
the results of elections in Iran without having any specific knowledge about this country. This 
happened at an American Political Science Association (APSA) meeting in 1984, when Bueno 
de Mesquita predicted that Khamenei and Rafsanjani would emerge to lead the country together 
after the death of Khomeini.71
From a political and institutional perspective, this phenomenon can have important 
consequences. If policymakers believe that Bueno de Mequita is correct, this would alter 
the status of expertise within governments and jeopardize their role and their legitimacy in 
society. This change has not taken place yet, and it is not possible to know whether this will. 
Indeed, these models have no official and transparent track record given that list of the 
clients that have consulted these companies is confidential. One phenomenon needs to be 
underlined. Experts within governments, think-tanks, and academia resist this evolution. As 
they are extremely numerous they could present an obstacle to this change.
"Futures Studies": the Future of the Future? 
Prediction markets and quantitative approaches to forecasting are part of a growing trend 
that we witness in circles other than those of policy. Global academia has proven to be rather 
favorable to what is being called "futures studies". A "futures studies" epistemic community has 
now developed. This community aims to develop tools that would make predictions possible 
in any field. Predicting or forecasting is in the process of becoming a sui generis field or 
science. Prestigious universities such as Oxford have created centers for the study of the future, 
where predictors from different disciplines convene and publish their work.72 Conferences are 
held periodically which gather scholars from the hard and social sciences. Members of this 
community publish regularly in journals such as the International Journal of Forecasting.73 This 
community is very active in Europe and in the United States as well as in Asia.74 Its members 
are also very involved in consulting and other policy work.
71 In this case, Bueno de Mesquita was right, whereas experts on Iran who were present and heavily criticized 
his approach made a wrong prediction.
72 http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/home 
73 http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505555/description 
74 For a list of centers and universities where futures studies are taught and where more generally courses on how 
to make predictions are part of the curriculum, see http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/recherche-predictions/2010/02/03/
forecasters-as-epistemic-communities/
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Iv — foCal poInts
As documented in the first section, "defense and security" is the prevailing meta-future that 
orients the experts’ vision of the future worlds we might live in, i.e. the world where US interests 
are at stake. It should be noted that prioritizing certain regions of the world that appear today as 
vital security issues for the US might not be the best way to address the issue of future worlds. 
Indeed, US national interest might change: its very definition as well as the issues that are of 
most concern to the US might evolve. The national interest of the US will also derive from 
facts that do not appear on today’s horizon. More broadly and substantively, the future of the 
world might not be a world in which US interests structure the relations between its players. 
"Defense and security" as a meta-future is compatible with an interest in those different parts 
of the world where the US tragic struggle for power seems to be at play. It nurtures itself on the 
information provided by the study of those specific regions. In the two decades that followed 
September 11, the Arab world has been analyzed through the lens of terrorism. Previously, 
other focal concepts such as "totalitarianism" and "authoritarianism" were the constituent 
elements of Soviet studies. 
Think-tanks are not the only knowledge providers that share this dual vision. It also prevails 
in academia. International relations specialists traditionally coexist with "area specialists", 
scholars who study a given country or a part of the world. In academia as well, countries and 
geographical areas have often been prioritized based on current events and for political reasons. 
Departments of Soviet studies proliferated during the Cold War and are now an extinct species 
(Russian specialists are only its pale descendants), then Middle Eastern Studies departments 
took the lead for 20 years. Given the role of China, the number of Chinese students who come 
to the US to earn doctoral degrees, and the number of US students who travel to China, one 
can easily forecast that they might be superseded by Chinese studies (except if another region 
or country suddenly challenges the US or seems threatening to US interests). Another possible 
scenario—not incompatible with an increase in knowledge about China75—is the decline of 
area studies themselves. This is already very much the case in American academia — the 
area studies approach has considerably lost ground—yet it has not materialized in think-tanks, 
which have to face strong demand on the part of those who have a specific interest in specific 
parts of the word. 
This section discusses empirically the themes that are of interest to think-tanks and their 
researchers. Think-tanks follow world events and prioritize them according to the criteria that 
are relevant for those who employ their services. This section is based on the assumption that 
the priorities that emerge from an analysis of the content of their websites and the literature 
they produce are a reflection of how think-tanks and their clients see the world developing. 
It should be added that think-tanks are caught in a dilemma. They sell their expertise to their 
clients by drafting reports that are sometimes made available only to those clients. There is, as 
it was underlined in the first section, a secrecy dimension in their activities. However, think-
75 China could be framed as an international relations / global issue.
Les Etudes du CERI - n° 184 - Ariel Colonomos - février 2012 29
tanks also need to be highly visible in the public sphere. In so doing, they aim at building their 
credibility and their reputation. What they release is also constitutive of their identity. Therefore, 
the great amount of information publicly available is a good indicator of their priorities and 
how they see the world. 
This section discusses the content of the websites of those think-tanks where a very large 
collection of data is made available.76 My purpose is to assess the number of times certain themes 
and geographical areas appear on the think-tanks’ websites (the number of pages where these 
words appear). This data should give an indication about the priorities of each think-tank. 
This section discusses these preferences, which are another key element in the analysis of the 
small world of expertise. I have looked at three sets of data: (1) the number of entries of specific 
regional areas or countries, (2) the number of entries of specific international issues, (3) the 
number of entries indicating an interest in the future of a region and/or an international issue.
The first two lessons we can draw from this graph are the following. As with the other data 
we collected, this data shows the great homogeneity of the social milieu of think-tanks whose 
members use the same language and share the same interests. This is consistent with the 
findings of the first section. We can clearly see that the lines are parallel, the lows and the 
peaks being very similar. In the areas that are not considered part of US national interest—the 
Balkans, Sudan or Congo—the number of hits is very low. In contrast, a small country such as 
Cuba that has a great symbolic value and also is an issue at the domestic level appears quite 
76 As I did in the previous section, I used the "Google advanced search" engine.
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frequently on the websites, at a level comparable to that of Taiwan.77 The most referenced 
countries are Iran, Iraq, Israel, or Pakistan. The European Union is at the bottom of the list. 
Except for the CFR, Brazil,78 a country of significant importance in contemporary international 
relations, is clearly neglected. Not taking into account Brazil is also very telling of the kind of 
paradigm still en vogue in international politics. As there is no possibility of military conflict 
with that country and as its emergence as a new power in international politics is relatively 
new, think-tanks’ literature on Brazil is scarce and rather anecdotal. This is also symptomatic 
of the difficulty experts face to have a unique vision of the future. Indeed, one of the keys of 
accurate anticipation is to select what the important issues will be tomorrow, instead of trying 
to project old frameworks and taking issues that were relevant in the past in order to envision 
possible future worlds. Under this later approach, the imagined future becomes the image of 
what are the current "devils du jour". Claims about the future reflect the values and obsessions 
of the time period when they are made.79 
Salient International Issues and Popular Futures
Security issues are discussed much more than social ones or legal ones. This does not come 
as a surprise given who those experts are and also what the DC environment is. As with 
the other data collected, the graphs are parallel, indicating a deep consensus within a very 
homogeneous social world. 
Within the category of security, the terms that are used the most are those that convey the 
impression that we live in a dangerous environment where Western democracies and primarily 
the US have to defend themselves / itself against the danger of terrorism. "Homeland security" 
is a priority dictated by what is considered to be in the US national interest. This language 
77 This data does not appear in the table above. For the sake of clarity, we have not published all the data we 
have processed.
78 See the CFR’s initiative on Brazil: http://www.cfr.org/brazil/global-brazil-us-brazil-relations/p25407?co=C007303. 
There is also a lack of expertise on Brazil in the academic field of international studies.
79 This is very much the case in other areas where social sciences are being used by policy, as in the case of 
demographical forecasts. See Le Bras, 1984.
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however never tells us what the definition of national interest is. This lexicon contributes to the 
dramatization of international politics and creates an horizon of fear. This vocabulary clearly 
reflects a linear and teleological meta-future. There is no issue in international politics other 
than threat and fear, and terrorist attacks are the supporting evidence of such a tragic destiny. 
"Threat" appears very regularly on the majority of the think-tanks’ sites; overall one page out 
of 5 or 6 includes this terminology (see below). The frequency of its use does not depend on 
the political identity of the think-tank.
Peace is part of the lexicon of think-tanks. Peace is the logical counterpart to war and is 
therefore widely used in international politics, even outside the realm of "peace studies" 
where idealist and legal approaches prevail. Peace reflects a linear vision of the future as 
if international politics were always caught in a dialectic between war and peace. Peace is 
the opposite of what is considered for historical reasons the reference point of the study of 
international politics, namely war. Ultimately, peace would be the goal of those who master 
the grammar of war and therefore know how to avoid its trap. As the opposite to war, peace 
becomes a label used to characterize the boundaries of international politics. But there are 
few experts on the social logics of peace except at USIP and Carnegie, whereas the town is 
full of experts of war and terrorism.
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As it can be seen from the tag cloud above, there is no particular interest in the issue of multipolarity. 
The use of multilateralism is not very widespread. It also depends on the political identity of the 
think-tank. Conservative organizations clearly tend to deliberately avoid it (AEI, Hudson, Heritage). 
Among social issues, there is a preference for "technology", "energy" and "health". "Climate" 
operates less as a magnet than one could have thought given the media attention given to 
natural catastrophes.80 The three entries mentioned above clearly reflect a materialistic vision 
of the world and echo the importance given to an analysis of the available resources on which 
peoples and states can rely. Those issues often fuel a reflection on conflicts, both international 
and domestic. The entry "technology" includes discussions about the internet and its possible 
misuses by violent groups.
This graph shows the number of pages that include both the term "future" and the name of a 
country or an issue. These different organizations are betting on very similar horses. For most 
of them, China is one of the most if not the most important issues they want to investigate 
when thinking about the future. It reflects a strong interest in the future of big countries that 
are likely to be competitors of the US and a very traditional vision of international politics, 
where the most important issues are war and peace. However, there are relatively few China 
experts at these think-tanks.
War, law, and peace are the keywords that are most frequently used. Their scores are similar, 
this is mostly due to the fact that they are being used together in the same context in order to 
describe a situation of conflict or correlatively a situation of post-war peace agreement. "Future" 
and "peace" appear together more in liberal organizations such as Carnegie (in absolute terms, 
a very big website), whereas they are found much less on the Heritage website. This reflects the 
political orientation of these think-tanks, yet it is the only striking difference between liberals 
and conservatives which both associate with the terms war or peace to the word future with 
similar frequencies. 
80 Some of these entries are not to be found in the charts, for the sake of clarity.
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These think-tanks focus on a world vision that reflects teleological vision of the world, i.e. 
a vision of the tragic destiny of the US struggling with its main competitors. This is consistent 
with the fact that these organizations prioritize the US national interest when they choose 
their research projects. Issues that are not a priori part of this narrative or cannot be easily 
included—such as internet, epidemic, or the youth-bulge—are hardly mentioned.
Two Future Worlds’ Laboratories: The CFR and the NIC
Two institutions deserve specific attention, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC-CIA). Indeed, these two organizations have an explicit interest in 
future-related issues and in forecasting future events. 
The CFR’s interest in the future is very consistent with the emphasis on prevention that 
prevailed over the last decade, either from a unilateral perspective when the US uses force 
preventively, or from a multilateral one when the UN seeks to prevent civil wars and genocides.
One of the CFR’s special units, the Center for Preventive Action (CPA),81 provides resources 
they recommend be used to prevent major political and economic crisis. In 2009, the CPA 
decided to launch a new initiative. At the beginning of each year, a list of scenarios would be 
established about events that might occur over the next 18 months time frame. According to 
an explicit rule, these events are prioritized depending on their importance to the US national 
interest. The CPA has launched a Contingency Plan Roundtable Series of meetings that takes 
place every month. The group, composed of CFR staff and members, who come mostly from 
the US government, gathers with an informed expert to discuss a possible scenario. During these 
meetings, the plausibility of the scenario is tested and discussed. The memo that summarizes 
the findings of the group is subsequently published and put online.82 A contingency plan is 
established at the end of the meeting. The advantages of these meetings are numerous. The 
CFR operates as a bridge between the experts’ world and policy circles. It is also a meeting 
place where people within the government can meet and exchange views. 
The summary memos are well documented and extremely balanced and, even in retrospect, 
insightful. They address issues of great concern at the time the meeting is being held. Their 
aim is to provide the administration and policymakers with possible responses to the scenarios 
discussed. 
A report on Egypt’s instability was drafted in August 2009: unrest and revolution were 
considered to be possible scenarios for 2010 or 2011. Two options were considered and discussed 
in this report: "a military intervention resulting from a contested succession" and "an Islamist 
push for political power".83 This is interesting since indeed Egypt faced unrest and Mubarak 
was ousted from power. This testifies to the insight of the CFR and those who participated to 
81 http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/cpa/index.html
82 http://i.cfr.org/projects/world/center-for-preventive-action-contingency-roundtable-series/pr1412
83 http://i.cfr.org/egypt/political-instability-egypt/p19696
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the meeting. It also elicits two further comments. First, these two scenarios reflect the two 
issues and paradigms that have prevailed over the last decades in Middle Eastern Studies: 
authoritarianism and Islamism. They also reflect a vision shared by US policymakers who have 
traditionally supported authoritarian regimes such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia and have feared 
and denounced Islamism. What prevails in this scenario where the future is the prolongation 
of the past is the sense of continuity. 
The Egypt case was chosen in great part because of the importance for the US of Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. The scenario was based on a preexisting prevailing concern. Had the exercise 
been more divorced from US security imperatives (or what they were considered to be), the 
scenario might have been different. It might have included other states such as Tunisia, Libya, 
or Syria which, while not critical US allies in need of protection, were equally important to 
the evolution of the so-called "Arab spring" of which Egypt was also a part. 
The CIA-NIC Reports 
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is not a think-tank. Yet it occupies a central role 
in the life of experts, notably because of the report it produces on the future of international 
politics. This document is widely circulated within the DC security experts community, many 
of whose members are consulted during the drafting process. It is therefore a reference point 
used in the "future claims" made in DC. For the sake of this study, it requires special attention. 
The history of the NIC goes back to the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor. This event highlighted 
the necessity of making anticipatory analyses of major events that risked damaging US power 
available. In 1950, a Board of National Estimates which would function as a council of "wise 
men" was created. Although the NIC was not officially created before 1979, the CIA began to 
draft those estimates in the aftermath of World War Two and the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) performed this task. 
The future is on the bureaucratic agenda each time a major international crisis occurs or when 
the world undergoes radical change. Therefore, the 1990s have been a particularly active period 
for the NIC. In 1996, the idea was launched to have reports named "Global Trends" published 
regularly. The first, released in 1997 developed scenarios to describe the major political issues of 
the world as they would appear in 2010. It stressed "trends", in this case the weakening of state 
order and the growing power of non-state actors, and the growing number of intra-state wars as 
opposed to inter-state wars. It also made some specific predictions such as the creation of a "de 
facto or de jure" Palestinian state by 2010. It also expressed the view that Saddam Hussein "will 
be gone" by 2010.84 It would be interesting to explain why and how these claims were made. 
Interestingly, some of them have a certain degree of truth. Whether they were expressed for valid 
reasons remains an open question. Some of these claims—as in the case of ancient oracles—are 
sufficiently vague that they appear accurate no matter how events unfold. 
84 http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_globaltrends2010.html
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Issues and keywords 
Issues	and	keywords
The CIA-NIC report is of specific importance because of the status of the CIA in the 
intelligence community and for US policy in general. Given its role, the CIA attracts analysts 
and experts from within and outside the intelligence community. It convenes a great number 
of analysts —experts from the think-tanks or academia—to its meetings. Consequently, the 
NIC sessions have become a locus of socialization for the community of security experts in 
DC. The NIC reports reflect these exchanges and are a clear picture of what the experts think 
collectively at a given time.
NIC reports have been discussed in diplomatic circles and other countries have decided 
to emulate the US. South Africa has its own report. China wants to develop its own study 
as a counter to the US vision. Russia has criticized Global Trends 2025, but Russians also 
plan to make their own report. The British Ministry of Defense has its own strategic trends 
program. Some contacts have been established with the Quai d’Orsay. The NIC built some 
intergovernmental networks and its reports have become focal points for diplomatic discussions. 
These non-US reports are modeled on the NIC’s initial format. 
These reports and the intergovernmental discussions that follow on the basis of their 
findings create horizons of expectations. The report is used in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR). In principle, the purpose of this work is not to make predictions. The report 
develops trends. However, as shown earlier in the paper, trends, predictions and forecasts 
tend to overlap. 
The number of hits of certain issues and themes that can be found in the document tells us a 
lot about the cognitive map of those who have elaborated the report. It is very much consistent 
with the preferences within the think-tank community as they appear on their websites. The 
report is a picture of the world at 2025 seen through the prism of what is considered to be the 
US interest in maximizing its security. Although there is no definition of what constitutes the 
US "national interest", let alone what it will be in 2025 (although when making a sound claim 
about the future of security, this aspect of the anticipation is essential), the report considers 
new challengers that would put the hegemonic role of the US in world affairs at risk and 
eventually damage US security.
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The report indicates significant interest in Russia, India, and China. It does not make 
use of the BRIC category very much, and considerably neglects the role of Brazil, which 
is seen to be, at best, a growing regional power. This is truly a shortsighted vision. There 
are good reasons to think that the world at 2025 might be organized around a structure 
in which Brazil has an increased role and the definition of power might be different from 
what it is today. 
China, in contrast, attracts a great deal of attention. China is seen as a serious competitor, 
both in economic and military terms. The scenarios the report draws on point to an increase 
in influence of China in world affairs, although, quite reasonably, the document points to a 
likely slowdown in China’s economic growth. China’s intellectual and scientific resources 
will be of considerable weight and will contribute to the development of the country as it 
becomes one of the major players in world affairs. These conclusions are strikingly linear 
and are very much a reflection of what is being said about the current situation of China 
in world affairs. The report rarely makes reference to possible discontinuities in China’s 
development, although China’s political cohesion could be imperiled by social movements 
and the increase of economic inequalities. 
The NIC report echoes the preferences and the concerns of the two worlds of expertise—
that of the think-tank community and that of policymakers in governmental agencies. It 
expresses a strong preference for linearity and continuity and draws from very classical 
models. It is loosely inspired by a very traditional approach to international relations 
grounded in realism and neo-realism. It is grounded on a discussion about the polarity of 
the international system. It reflects the opinions of many analysts whether in academia or in 
think-tanks according to whom the era of American unipolarity is over. They see an ongoing 
shift toward multilateralism and emerging powers as the true challenges to US power. In 
their view, international relations will find an equilibrium on the basis of this multi-polarity 
and the logic of balancing—a concept drawn from neo-realism—will prevail. The report 
also echoes another idea that was quite prevalent in the IR literature during the 1990s. It 
stresses the importance of the divide between state and non-state actors, arguing that this 
will continue to be an important feature of tomorrow’s world. Except for some wild cards 
and unexpected events that are described in some hypothetical scenarios such as a tsunami 
that destroys Wall Street in 2020, the report focuses on trends that describe a linear evolution 
of international politics. Interestingly, the hypothesis of a natural disaster that would harm 
New York has been shown to be plausible, when the recent storm Irene hit New York at the 
end of August (2011). The storm raised concerns about possible damage to the New York’s 
population and infrastructures as well as to costal areas. 
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v — what Does It take for an IDea to be hearD In DC? 
Those who make claims about the future abide by certain rules, in great part because, in 
order to be heard, their ideas need to have a certain format and adapt to those to whom they 
are addressed (and to their expectations): nothing else will fly. Thus, in the leading think-tanks, 
radicalism is clearly not the best way to make oneself heard. Extreme-right or extreme-left 
ideas are very scarce if not absent all together.85 Experts speak the same language and are 
interested in similar issues that are prioritized according to very similar criteria. The members 
of this community are constrained by rigid formats that also depend on the needs of the 
policy organizations to which their studies are addressed and on the rules established by other 
institutions that fund their activities. Experts elaborate ideas that are caught in temporal cycles. 
They necessarily lag behind the evolution of world politics, notably because of the inertia of 
bureaucratic politics. 
The temporal cycles in which these experts are caught also reflect their education, which 
has influenced how they see the world. Until today, their choices have tended to reflect a 
preference for a realist vision of the world, which was highly predominant when they started to 
socialize in an academic environment and when they earned their University degrees. Given 
the importance of Islam and the lack of attention to Latin America, this picture of the world is 
also consistent with Huntington’s thesis about the "Clash of Civilizations". It will be interesting 
to see through what lenses experts will see the world in 10, 20, or 50 years and to what extent 
their analyses will reflect what IR and social sciences have been in the last two decades. It 
would also be interesting to see the impact of major events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and September 11 and ongoing changes in the Arab world on the vision of the future of those 
who have been educated in the 2000s.86 
Not diverging from an established norm is very important for an idea to be heard in DC’s 
public space. Ideas about the future strongly converge in focal points. How can we account 
for this phenomenon? The think-tanks community is a very solid illustration of what social 
psychologist Irving Janis called "groupthink"87 Janis studied some major foreign policy decisions, 
such as the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the war in North Korea, and the decision to escalate 
in Vietnam. He was surprized by the errors that were being made and that resulted from the 
analysis of a group of heavily trained and competent experts. Think-tanks gather more people 
than the small circles studied by Janis did. They gather professionals that are not necessarily 
in direct contact with each other. Finally, the experts and the organizations that are examined 
in this study are not directly involved in decision-making. Therefore some of the groupthink 
criteria do not apply to them.
85 Some experts can have conservative views, but would not express racist views. If so, they would face the 
risk of being ousted by their community.
86 To what extent experts will use constructivist theories that greatly developed in the 1990s and beyond? Will 
rational choice and computer sciences be prevalent? To what extent global history will be one possible outlook?
87 Janis, 1972.
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Janis lists eight characteristics of the major symptoms of the groupthink syndrome88: 
1 – An illusion of invulnerability is predominant within the group and encourages the group 
to excessive optimism and risk taking decisions.
2 – There are collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings. 
3 – Beliefs in the group’s inherent morality are unquestioned.
4 –  Stereotyped views of enemy leaders are predominant. 
5 – There is a pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against the decision 
of the majority. 
6 – Self-censorship of deviations applies. 
7 – There are shared illusions of unanimity. 
8 – We see the emergence of self-appointed mind guards. 
There is some overlap between the groupthink phenomenon in decision-making and the 
thinking elaborated by security experts in DC. Some of the groupthink criteria are particularly 
relevant here, namely 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Janis underlines the role of morality. Among think-tank based security experts, there is a 
prevailing belief in the rectitude of the group’s norms and paradigms through which international 
politics is being analyzed and the format to be used in order to deliver the experts’ findings. 
These are formatted in a narrative whose thread is the importance of advancing the national 
interest of the US. This creates strong normative pressure that is rarely questioned publicly 
within the group. Stereotypical views of enemy leaders and more generally of what and who 
the enemy is are predominant. We are today at the end of a cycle that has lasted for two 
decades, when experts clearly focused their attention on Islamic terrorist networks, whereas 
during the Cold War the Soviet Union was the common enemy. 
The marketplace of ideas makes it very difficult for experts to express ideas that diverge from 
the norm of what is expected from them. Self-censorship applies because experts know that 
expressing divergent views will make it less likely they will be heard. Traditionally, most of 
them will bandwagon and participate to an already existing debate—the necessity for the US 
to intervene in given country X, being the most frequent example—and will try to develop an 
argument that only differs slightly from the already prevailing opinion. 
There are indeed shared illusions of unanimity. The number of senior specialists of China 
is limited, yet China is an often discussed theme. Most of the views expressed about China 
reflect a linear vision of China’s future according to which China’s power is growing and will 
continue to do so, thereby endangering US primacy in international affairs. There are very few 
alternative views. It would be indeed difficult for dissonant voices to be heard. China’s future 
as it is envisaged today reminds us of the way experts once looked at the USSR. The same 
linear path was anticipated. Betting on the breakdown of the Soviet system was as risky and 
bold as outlining the problems the Chinese system produces which might disrupt its domestic 
political cohesion. 
88 Ibid.: 197.
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There is another reason why such a tunneling effect prevails on the DC marketplace of ideas 
about the future. Experts have a sense of what visions of the future are likely to be accepted 
by the public: those futures generally imply decisions that are not too costly for policymakers. 
It will be very difficult for an expert to bring into the public policy discussion an idea the 
implementation of which would require a costly shift from actual policy. That is the reason 
why anticipating that a challenger will be in place for a long time is an accepted and such a 
common view. Policymakers are used to having state X as a competitor, breaking away from 
this routine would be very disruptive. 
"Future claims" are not only about the future. Possibly they serve other purposes that 
this study aims to highlight. One of the most significant is to trigger dialogue about policy 
through the exchange of ideas and methods. Another is to ensure that there are good relations 
between experts and practitioners. The future serves as a topic for conversation between 
the two communities. Discussing the future solidifies the bridges between the two groups 
whose members already have many overlapping interests due to their common background 
and their similar career. 
This is a paradox, but anticipations are about bringing stability. Linear futures stabilize the 
present and give more weight to decisions that do not break away from well-established 
paths. Linear futures consolidate a system of norms. Institutions need to elaborate and follow 
norms. Indeed, rules of behavior and doctrines need to rely on some empirical assumptions 
about the future that imply some regularity. True, the expression "war on terror" suggests 
that there might be some very abrupt and sudden events that would disrupt the social and 
political order of democracies. Yet, this assumption is based on a linear vision according to 
which terrorist networks are developing. According to this vision, which is based on the claim 
that terrorism is a social trend, potential terrorist attacks are not the exception, they become 
the normal state of US security. Therefore, new rules have to be established to challenge this 
new situation. Eventually this vision can backfire, since focusing on a trend that is rooted on 
a backward-oriented vision of international politics is likely to divert attention from ongoing 
changes that will break with this linear past.
vI — what Can we learn from not antICIpatIng the arab revolutIons?
This study started in late 2010 and most of the empirical research was carried out during 
March-May 2011. What is now being called the "Arab spring" which actually went into the 
fall has been an interesting moment for the study of predictions. The series of revolutions that 
started with the uprisings in Tunisia came as even more of a surprise than the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
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The parallel between those two unanticipated major events is striking. In both instances the 
events were unanticipated by the experts working in the area.89 They explicitly favored the 
hypothesis of continuity. A considerable number of experts worked on both areas. It must be 
noted that both Soviet and Middle Eastern studies can be considered fields that were in great 
part developed in the US for political reasons and where political ideas (different in the two 
cases) played a significant role.90 Even beyond academia, over the last 20 years, the "Arab and 
Muslim world" has been the focal point of attention of the media and a majority of security 
experts. This was also the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Social sciences provided tools that necessarily implied continuity. It was therefore very unlikely 
that social scientists would anticipate change. During the 1950s and the 1960s, "totalitarianism" 
was the concept en vogue to characterize the Soviet Union, which was then replaced by the 
term "authoritarianism". The worldview that prevailed until the end of the 1980s was that there 
was a "balance of power" between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the case of the 
Arab and Muslim world, "authoritarianism" was widely used in the literature to depict Arab 
secular regimes that were using their political and military power to put a stronghold on societies 
where, otherwise, according to this narrative, Islamic movements would have prevailed. This 
also implied a strong degree of continuity. In both cases, social sciences—whether in academia 
or as applied knowledge in the field of policy—operated as blinders.91 
Those two radical moments of rupture were not anticipated because strong social pressure 
was put on a community of experts, leaving no room for those who could have argued that 
instability and change were likely. Arguing that the Soviet Union would fall and that Eastern 
European societies would challenge their governments would have signaled that the Soviet 
Bloc was less of a threat than seemed. 
Such claim would have been seen as anti-patriotic, fool hearted and naïve. Claiming that the 
Soviet Bloc would fall would also have called for substantive and therefore costly changes in 
US foreign policy. In the world of think-tanks, claiming that Arab governments would fall and 
that a revolutionary and democratic project was underway could also have been interpreted 
as a naïve and dangerous historical vision, given that Islamism was described as the only 
plausible alternative to the stability of authoritarianism.92 If policymakers had been required 
to validate this hypothesis, they would have had to change drastically the orientation of their 
foreign policy. Their support for autocratic leaders in Tunisia and Egypt clearly shows they 
were unwilling to do so. 
89 On the "Arab spring", see Gause, 2011.
90 Colonomos, 2011a. The case for the Middle Eastern Studies as an "American invention" has been discussed 
by Martin Kramer, himself an expert on the Middle East, in a controversial book highly critical of the field 
(Kramer, 2001).
91 Available online at: http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012333746-1989-2011-les-illeres-des-sciences-sociales 
92 Things are different in Academia. The focus has been on the specificity of the Arab world and many scholars 
have strongly criticized the possible use of democracy as a concept to analyze Middle Eastern societies. Indeed, 
some see this notion as a Western construct that lacks universality. According to Kramer, Middle Eastern studies 
moved away from the dominant paradigms of modernization and political development that dominated the social 
sciences in the 1950s and 1960s and then coalesced around Saïd’s idea of "Orientalism". Orientalism becomes 
a meta-paradigm, upon which relies the study of a set of different social and political issues.
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Once radical change happened, the prevailing view was that the former Soviet Bloc was 
building its market economy. Today the prevailing framework used to characterize change in the 
Arab world is democratization, and eventually transitional justice. In both cases, two teleological 
narratives have replaced two narratives of permanence serving as operational focal points for 
policy. Concepts that indicate linear change alternate with notions that dismiss the possibility of 
change. It is very likely that new concepts that will indicate permanence and stability will emerge 
to characterize the situation of Arab countries once new leaders and new rules replace the old 
system. In countries such as China systemic change has not happened (yet). Although this society 
is evolving rapidly, in part because of a strong economy, many China experts stress the logic of 
political continuity that cannot be overwhelmed by economic and social transformations. This 
view is, for example, well portrayed in the notion of "authoritarian resilience".93
 ConClusIon: the future praCtICe nexus 
The community of predictors and the political world of practitioners are strongly tied 
together. Not only, are they socially intertwined as it is shown in the first section of this study, 
there is also a deeper nexus—both social and epistemic—between the two universes and the 
two forms of practice. On the one hand, practitioners of international security, although well 
aware of the limitations of predictions have not shown a great willingness to stimulate and 
encourage innovation in this field. On the contrary, they take these limitations for granted and 
have accepted them. On the other, predictors are aware that practitioners will not drastically 
change their behavior, even if their anticipations were to suggest that change in actual policy 
is called for. This does not encourage them to change the way they think about the future. 
There is a future practice nexus. As in scenarios, "future claims" are mostly linear. There 
are epistemic reasons for that. It is, indeed, difficult to anticipate and formalize change. There 
are other important reasons for predictions to be linear. Predictors are trained in the habit of 
making linear anticipations because these predictions will not deviate from an existing norm 
inside and outside their community. They know that these predictions should not deviate 
from the expectations of the policy arena if they are to gain acceptance: predictions are not 
designed to trigger major changes in the actual decision process. This is a social self-reinforcing 
mechanism: linearity reinforces the bias for inaction and vice-versa. 
Does that mean that anticipation as a form of knowledge is to be dismissed? First, there are 
attempts to change the nature and the quality of predictions, possibly leading to more accuracy. 
However, the preference for stability over accuracy is a major obstacle to this process. Second, 
anticipations have an important social function. This system has a stabilizing function. "Future 
claims" stabilize the present. 
93 Nathan, 2003.
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Predictions also operate as a socialization mechanism that creates social integration reinforcing 
the ties between expertise and practice. This creates regularities of behavior within the two 
communities and shared expectations about their counterparts’ behavior. Norms such as security 
doctrines, strategic rules, and laws (domestic laws or laws of armed conflict) are nurtured by 
this commerce of future worlds, no matter how approximate and inaccurate those visions might 
be. In contrast, precision and accuracy would be disruptive because those norms would rely 
on variables that are too volatile. 
In conclusion, the following map aggregates data found on the think-tanks’ websites. It collects 
the number of hits when, on the same page, the term "future" is associated with the different 
regions of the world as shown on the map. Although very approximate, this picture illustrates 
what might be an interest in the future of these parts of the world. This is a good indicator 
of the actual foreign policy of the US. This consensus view of what the future of the world 
might be does not imply any need to change actual policy. We can make a final prediction. 
This picture fuels and reinforces expectations and beliefs. Thereby increasing the likehood 
that when change occurs it will come as a surprise. We will be all the more surprized when 
a non-linear event altering the structure of international politics occurs.
Hits* (thousands)
* Hudson, Heritage, Rand, USIP, NAF, Carnegie, Brookings, CFR.
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– Council on Foreign Relations (2)
– Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3)
– Center for Strategic and International Studies (4)
– RAND Corporation (5)
– Heritage Foundation (6)
– American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research (AEI) (7)
– Cato Institute (8)
– United States Institute for Peace (16)
– Hudson Institute (21)
– Center for New American Security (23)
– New America Foundation (24)
– Center for Transatlantic Relations SAIS, Johns 
Hopkins University (48)
– Washington Institute for Near East Policy (unlisted)
– Lexington Institute (unlisted)
B - Second section, "Words for telling the future"
– Brookings Institution (1)
– Council on Foreign Relations (2)
– Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3)
– Center for Strategic and International Studies (4)
– RAND Corporation (5)
– Heritage Foundation (6)
– American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research (AEI) (7)
– Cato Institute (8)
– United States Institute for Peace (16)
– Hudson Institute (21)
– New America Foundation (24)
C - Fourth section, "Focal points"
– Brookings Institution (1)
– Council on Foreign Relations (2)
– Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3)
– RAND Corporation (5)
– Heritage Foundation (6)
– United States Institute for Peace (16)
– Hudson Institute (21)
– New America Foundation (24)
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 Appendice 2
 List of interviewees
– Michael Barone (AEI)
– Nora Bensahel (Center for a New American 
Security)
– Richard Betts (Columbia University, Institute of 
War and Peace)
– Ian Bremmer (Eurasia group)
– Stephen Biddle (CFR-DC)
– Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (NYU, Mesquita & 
Roundell)
– Matthew Burrows (CIA-NIC)
– Daniel L. Byman (Georgetown University, Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy)
– Michael Eisenstadt (the Washington Institute on 
Near East Policy)
– Roger George (National Defense University)
– Dan Goure (Lexington Institute)
– Robin Hanson (George Mason University)
– Bruce Hoffman (Georgetown University, Center 
for Peace and Security Studies)
– Robert Hunter (RAND) 
– Robert Jervis (Columbia University, Institute of 
War and Peace)
– Stuart Johnson (Rand)
– Christopher J. Lamb (INSS)
– Bowman Miller (National Intelligence University)
– Leo Michel (NDU)
– Robert Lieber (Georgetown University)
– Michael Oppenheimer (NYU, CGA)
– Harry Roundell (Mesquita & Roundell)
– Emile Servan-Schreiber (Newsfuture)
– Peter Singer (Brookings)
– Jack Snyder (Columbia University, Institute of 
War and Peace)
– Paul Stares (CFR-DC)
– Moeed Yusuf (USIP)
– Micah Zenko (CFR-NY)
  The number between brackets is the ranking of the organization as it appears on the Global Go to Think-
tank report (latest edition, 2011)
